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UNWINDING THE CEILING RULE
Leigh Osofsky*
This article closely examines the unwinding of the ceiling rule.
Congress and partnership tax experts historically have assumed perfect
unwinding of the ceiling rule on liquidation or sale of a partnership interest.
However, this assumption glosses over a significantly more complicated
reality. This article closely examines the history of section 704(c) and the
interaction between the ceiling rule and the rules regarding sales and
liquidations of partnership interests to reveal the extent to which the
assumption does not hold. By debunking long-held assumptions about the
perfect unwinding of the ceiling rule, this article displays that there is no
reasonable justification to maintain the ceiling rule, or the accompanying
complexity and distortion that the ceiling rule imposes on the partnership
tax system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called "ceiling rule," which applies under the traditional method
for making section 704(c) allocations, can misallocate income, gain, loss,
and deduction to both a partner contributing property and to
noncontributing partners. Notwithstanding these predictable misallocations,
the Treasury Department still permits application of the ceiling rule under
section 704(c).
Historically, Congress and partnership tax experts assumed perfect
unwinding of the ceiling rule on liquidation or sale of a partnership interest
- an assumption that still operates to some extent today. This assumption
glosses over a significantly more complicated reality. This article closely
examines the history of section 704(c) and the interaction between the
ceiling rule and the rules regarding sales and liquidations of partnership
interests. Doing so reveals that when and to what extent the perfect
unwinding assumption holds depends, perhaps to a surprising degree, on (1)
a variety of relatively arbitrary facts regarding the assets held by the
partnership on liquidation or sale, and (2) the unintended interactions of
inordinately complicated partnership tax rules. In reaching this conclusion,
this article displays that the ceiling rule, which has always been part of the
section 704(c) regime, is even worse than commonly thought.
It is important to fully appreciate the extent to which the ceiling rule
can perpetuate mistaxation long after the liquidation or sale of a partner's
interest in the partnership. As this article will explain, the ceiling rule
results in enormous complexity and creates unjustifiable planning
opportunities that accrue to the well informed. The ceiling rule thereby
creates a mess of the fundamentally important section 704(c) partnership
tax rules governing allocations with respect to contributed property.
Despite the mess it makes of the section 704(c) regime, the ceiling rule has
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endured in part because of the oversimplified assumptions regarding its
unwinding and the resulting perceptions of its limited impact. By
debunking these long-held assumptions, this article displays there is no
reasonable justification to continue to retain the ceiling rule.
II. SECTION 704(c), THE CEILING RULE, AND THE ALTERNATIVES
A. The Need for Section 704(c)
Section 704(c) resolves a potential tension that could flow from two
basic tenets of partnership tax. First, as a general matter, contributions of
property to partnerships are not recognition events.1 Second, economic
gains, losses, or deductions to partners should be matched by tax gains,
losses, or deductions. 2 Since book capital accounts generally keep track of
economic consequences, this tenet can be referred to with the phrase, "tax
must follow book."'3 The problem is that while partners should not
recognize gain or loss for tax purposes on contribution of built-in gain or
loss property, for book purposes the contributing partner gets credit for the
fair market value of the contribution (net any liabilities that the partnership
assumes or takes subject to).4 As a result, the partner is going to take into
account the gain or loss for book (and economic) purposes, but not for tax
purposes. Section 704(c) is the mechanism that ensures that the tax
consequences of the contribution ultimately follow the book consequences.
Specifically, imagine the following scenario (Example 1). A and B
form a partnership. A contributes property (Property A) in exchange for a
one-half interest in all partnership profits, losses, and capital. Property A
has a basis in A's hands of $50 and a fair market value of $100. B
contributes cash of $100 in exchange for a 50% interest in all partnership
profits, losses, and capital. For book purposes, A and B will each get $100
in their capital accounts. 5 As a result, A gets credit for the $50 of built-in
gain in Property A for book purposes. A, however, does not recognize the
1 I.R.C. § 721(a). Exceptions apply. For instance, contribution of property to a
partnership, followed by distributions of the property can result in disguised sale treatment
and gain recognition. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B). Additionally, potential end-runs around section
704(c) in the form of distributions of contributed property to noncontributing partners and
distributions of other property to contributing partners can yield recognition events under
sections 704(c)(1)(B) and 737.
2 I.R.C. § 704(b).
3 LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K 90
(4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter LOGIC]; Gregory J. Marich et al., The Remedial Allocation
Method: A Viable Cure for the Ceiling Rule, 65 TAx NOTES 1267, 1269 (1994) [hereinafter A
Viable Cure].
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2013).
5Id.
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$50 of built-in gain for tax purposes. As a result, the partnership balance
sheet after the contribution is as follows: 6
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 100 100 A 50 100 50
Property A 50 100 B 100 100 100
Total 150 200 Total 150 200 150
When Property A is ultimately sold, the first $50 of tax gain should be
allocated to A. If the partnership sells Property A for $150, each partner
experiences a $25 gain for book purposes. 7 Yet there is a $100 gain for tax
purposes, resulting from the $150 amount realized minus the $50 basis that
the partnership holds in the property.8 B should recognize an amount of tax
gain that corresponds with the amount of book gain that B experienced, or
$25. A, on the other hand, should recognize the original $50 of tax gain that
was deferred on contribution of Property A to the partnership, as well as the
additional $25 gain that A experienced after the contribution of Property A
to the partnership.
Section 704(c)(1)(A) dictates that, "income, gain, loss, and deduction
with respect to property contributed to the partnership by a partner shall be
shared among the partners so as to take account of the variation between the
basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time
of contribution." 9 As a result, A recognizes $75 of gain for tax purposes
and B recognizes $25 of gain for tax purposes, even though they each
increase their book capital accounts by $25.10 Section 704(c) thereby
ensures that tax consequences do follow book consequences with respect to
contributed property, albeit in a delayed fashion.11 The partnership balance
sheet after the sale appears as follows:
6 Where helpful, partnership balance sheets are inserted to serve as a guide for the
reader. Since there are no liabilities in the examples, the balance sheets do not list liabilities.
Rather, they keep track of the tax basis and book value of the partnership's assets on the left-
hand side, and the tax and book capital accounts of the partners on the right-hand side.
Outside basis is also added as a column on the right-hand side, in order to assist in
determining the tax result to partners on liquidation or sale of a partner's interest in the
partnership.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2013).
8 I.R.C. §§ 723, 1001.
9 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A).
10 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(2), ex. (1)(iii) (2013).
11 LoGic, supra note 3, at 91; A Viable Cure, supra note 3, at 1269.
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ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 250 250 A 125 125 125
B 125 125 125
Total 250 250 Total 250 250 250
Section 704(c) applies to the contribution of depreciable property as
well. In these cases, section 704(c) also attempts to ensure that tax follows
book in a delayed fashion. The reconciliation of tax and book does not have
to await the sale or disposition of the property. Rather, it can occur over the
life of the property, through allocations of depreciation, which take into
account the variation between the basis of the property and the fair market
value at the time of contribution.
Imagine, for instance, the following scenario (Example 2). The same
facts apply as in Example 1, except that Property A is depreciable property,
which the partnership depreciates over a ten-year period, using the straight-
line method. The partnership would be able to depreciate $5 per year for tax
purposes. If the partnership chooses the traditional method to make section
704(c) allocations, then the partnership would be able to depreciate $10 per
year for book purposes, which will be allocated equally among the partners
in accordance with their economic agreement. 12 In terms of allocating the
tax depreciation under section 704(c), the partnership will first allocate tax
depreciation to the noncontributor, B, to match B's book depreciation to the
extent possible. 13 In this case, all $5 of tax depreciation per year is
allocated to B.14 A now takes into account the built-in gain through reduced
tax depreciation deductions over the life of the property.
B. Section 704(c) Allocation Methods
1. The Traditional Method
There are a number of ways to implement section 704(c). The
Treasury Regulations governing section 704(c) bless three different
allocation methods as "generally reasonable": the traditional method, the
traditional method with curative allocations, and the remedial allocation
method. 15
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3) (2013).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (2013).
14 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(2), ex. (1)(ii) (2013).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) (2013).
20141
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The traditional method is subject to the ceiling rule. Crucially, the
ceiling rule dictates, "[T]he total income, gain, loss, or deduction allocated
to the partners for a taxable year with respect to a property cannot exceed
the total partnership income, gain, loss, or deduction with respect to that
property for the taxable year."' 16 In other words, only the income, gain, loss,
or deduction that exists at the partnership level can be allocated among the
partners.
In certain situations, however, there may not be sufficient partnership
tax income, gain, loss, or deduction to take into account both the
precontribution gain or loss in the property and the events subsequent to the
contribution. In such situations, the ceiling rule will result in misallocation
of tax income, gain, loss, or deduction for both the contributing partner and
the noncontributing partners.
Imagine now the following example (Example 3). The facts posed in
Example 1 apply, except that the partnership ultimately sold Property A for
$50, rather than $150. Since Property A was on the partnership books at a
value of $100, there was a $50 decline in the book value of the property,
which should be allocated equally between the partners, in accordance with
their economic agreement. 17
Examining each partner's individual situation is instructive regarding
the tax allocations that would be necessary for tax to follow book in a
delayed fashion. Prior to contribution of the property, A experienced a gain
of $50. Upon contribution, A had a one-half interest in Property A, which
had a book value of $100. After contribution, A experienced a decline in
value of the property of $25. On a net basis, A experienced a $25 gain in
book value of the property. B experienced only the decline in value after
the contribution of the property to the partnership, or a $25 decline in book
value.
If the partnership were viewed as an aggregate of the partners, A should
recognize a $25 gain for tax purposes on sale of Property A, and B should
recognize a $25 loss for tax purposes. Indeed, this result would be
necessary in order to satisfy the general purpose of section 704(c). There is
no tax gain at the partnership level however, because the property is being
sold for the basis that the partnership holds in the property.18 Because the
ceiling rule mandates that only the tax income, gain, loss, or deduction that
exists at the partnership level can be allocated among the partners, the
partnership may allocate no gain to A and no loss to B.19 As a result, A ends
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (2013).
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2013).
18 I.R.C. §§ 723, 1001.
19 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(2), ex. (I)(iii) (2013).
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up with too little tax gain and B ends up with too little tax loss. The
partnership balance sheet after sale of Property A reflects these results and
appears as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 150 150 A 50 75 50
B 100 75 100
Total 150 150 Total 150 150 150
Similar problems can occur in the context of the application of the
ceiling rule to depreciable property. The following scenario provides a
demonstration (Example 4). The same facts fiom Example 2 apply, except
that the basis of Property A on contribution was $20. As a result, after
contribution, the partnership balance sheet is as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 100 100 A 20 100 20
Property A 20 100 B 100 100 100
Total 120 200 Total 120 200 120
The annual book depreciation would remain $10 and would still be
allocated equally between the partners.2 0 There would now be only $2 of
annual tax depreciation at the partnership level, because the partnership
holds Property A with a basis of $20. Annual tax depreciation would still
be allocated to the noncontributor, B, to the extent possible to match annual
book depreciation allocated to B.2 1 In this case only $2 of tax depreciation
would be available at the partnership level to allocate to B, whereas B
would be allocated $5 of depreciation a year for book purposes. As a result,
B would be allocated too little tax depreciation, relative to the amount of
book depreciation, while A would not have to take into account the full
extent of built-in gain over the life of Property A.22 Both Example 3 and
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3) (2013).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (2013).
22 The built-in gain on contribution of the property was $80. Over the life of Property
A, partner A would be allocated $50 of book depreciation and no tax depreciation. As a
result, A would take into account $50 of the $80 of built-in gain over the life of the property.
However, the remaining $30 of built-in gain would not be taken into account by A over the
life of the property. This $30 of built-in gain that A does not take into account offsets exactly
2014]
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Example 4 illustrate the more general point: when the ceiling rule applies
under the traditional method, it must result in misallocations of income,
gain, loss, and deduction to both the contributor and noncontributors.
2. The Alternative Methods
Two alternative methods blessed by Treasury Regulations can alleviate
the misallocations produced by the ceiling rule, to varying degrees. The
first alternative method is the traditional method with curative allocations,
which permits a partnership to "make reasonable curative allocations to
reduce or eliminate disparities between book and tax items of
noncontributing partners." 23  Curative allocations are "allocation[s] of
income, gain, loss, or deduction for tax purposes that diffe[r] from the
partnership's allocation of the corresponding book item. ' 24  Curative
allocations must be reasonable, in that they must not exceed "the amount
necessary to offset the effect of the ceiling rule;" they must occur over a
reasonable period of time; and they "must be expected to have substantially
the same effect on each partner's tax liability as the tax item limited by the
ceiling rule." 2
5
In Example 3, for instance, if the partnership had a tax gain from the
sale of another property, and such gain would be expected to have
substantially the same effect as gain from the sale of Property A, up to $25
of tax gain that would otherwise be allocated to B can be reallocated to A. 26
To the extent that a full $25 of tax gain that otherwise would have been
allocated to B is reallocated to A, the curative allocation will correct the
mistaxation from the ceiling rule.
In the context of Example 4, if the partnership has other depreciation
deductions, the partnership may allocate depreciation for tax purposes away
from A and to B to offset the effects of the ceiling rule. 27 Alternatively, if
the partnership has income that would have substantially the same effect as
income from Property A, the partnership can allocate such income away
from B and toward A to the extent necessary to offset the effects of the
ceiling rule.28
the $30 of depreciation that B will take for book purposes, but which will not be matched by
allocations of tax depreciation to B.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1) (2013).
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1) (2013).
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(3) (2013).
26 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(4), ex. 1 (2013).
27 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(4), ex. 2 (2013).
28 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(4), ex. 1 (2013).
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While the traditional method with curative allocations can "cure"
ceiling rule distortions, it depends on the existence of some other item of
partnership income, gain, loss, or deduction. The traditional method with
curative allocations cannot cure the misallocations of the ceiling rule absent
this other item at the partnership level.
The second alternative method that can cure ceiling rule misallocations
is the remedial allocation method, which does not depend on the existence
of items of actual partnership income, gain, loss, or deduction. Rather, the
remedial method allows the partnership to create remedial items (with
identical tax attributes as the tax item that is limited by the ceiling rule) of
income, gain, loss, or deduction to allocate to noncontributors, as necessary
to offset ceiling rule distortions. 29 The partnership must then create an
offsetting, identical remedial item to allocate to the contributing partner.
30
Imagine, for instance, the facts of Example 3, and that the partnership
has no other income. Under the remedial method, the partnership may
allocate $25 of tax loss (of a type identical to the loss that would have
occurred had Property A been sold for a loss) to B. The partnership would
allocate an offsetting $25 of tax gain (of an identical type) to A. 3 In
Example 4, the remedial allocation method would be slightly more
complicated. The remedial allocation method changes the schedule that
would otherwise apply for book depreciation. The remedial allocations of
depreciation deductions thus occur over a longer period of time.
32
Nonetheless, the end result is that remedial allocations of tax depreciation
can be allocated to B, offset by remedial allocations of income to A, albeit
over a longer period of time than would have occurred under the traditional
method with curative allocations. 33 In sum, the ceiling rule can produce
misallocations of income, gain, loss, and deduction, which can be cured in
some cases by the traditional method with curative allocations and in all
cases by the remedial method.34
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d) (2013).
30 Id.
31 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(7), ex. 2 (2013).
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(2) (2013).
33 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(7), ex. 1 (2013).
34 Some partnership tax experts have suggested that the remedial allocation method
might present some limited opportunities for abuse. See, e.g., GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C.
BURKE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 164 (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting that initial misvaluations may
allow for some mischief in the context of the remedial allocation method); A Viable Cure,
supra note 3, at 20 (discussing the potential for abuse relative to other methods in the context
of depreciable property, but ultimately concluding that it is not really abusive). Others have
suggested that the remedial allocation method offers little, if any, opportunity for abuse. See,
e.g., Laura Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), 3 FLA. TAX REV. 93, 125 (1996)
("Because of its nod to economic reality in computing book items, the remedial allocation
2014]
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III. EVOLUTION IN THINKING REGARDING SECTION 704(c)
It has been well understood since the initial creation of section 704(c)
that failure to account fully for precontribution gains and losses (as occurs
in cases in which the ceiling rule applies) can result in misallocations of
income, gain, loss, and deduction.35  There has been a more gradual
evolution in understanding regarding the impact of such misallocations.
This part explores that evolution. Doing so reveals that the ceiling rule has
remained part of the section 704(c) regime for decades in part because of
the mistaken and oversimplified assumptions regarding the unwinding of
the ceiling rule.
A. 1954: Original Misconceptions
The misallocations that can occur as a result of the ceiling rule were
inherent, and even more extreme, in the initial creation of section 704(c) in
1954. In 1954, the law was confused regarding partnership tax generally,
and allocations with respect to contributed property, specifically. 36 Section
method leaves little, if any, opportunity for creating shifts of income."). Some partnership
tax experts have suggested that a fourth option, a deferred sales method (which was not
ultimately incorporated into the section 704(c) scheme) might be better than the remedial
allocation method. See, e.g., Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered
Ceilings, and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (2009)
[hereinafter Saving Subchapter K]. This article does not seek to choose between the two
principal alternatives to the traditional method, which are the remedial method and the
deferred sales approach. Rather, the article seeks to show that there is no reasonable
justification for retaining the traditional method with the ceiling rule. As such, this article,
for instance, does not discuss the potential need for anti-churning rules under the remedial
method. Full consideration of which of the two alternatives is best is left for another day
(and has received interesting examination by others in other work).
35 See infra notes 42-48 (discussing early understandings of the misallocations
accompanied by beliefs that dampened concern about the misallocations).
36 For a good description of the early state of confusion and the need to settle it, see
Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), supra note 34, at 101-02. For useful
contemporary descriptions of the confused state of partnership tax in the 1950s, see J. Paul
Jackson et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partnerships
and Partner - American Law Institute Draft, 9 TAX L. REV. 109, 112 (1954) [hereinafter
1954 ALl Draft] (describing that "the present Code does little to govern the treatment of this
widespread form of business association" and that "[s]uch large areas as the treatment of
contributed property... are left largely untouched"); see also Forty Topics Pertaining to the
General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong. 1369 (1953) (statement of Mark
H. Johnson, Representative of American Bar Association) (describing the existing "sea of
doubt" regarding partnership taxation). As indicated by the American Law Institute, the
question of allocations with respect to contributed property was especially troublesome.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INCOME TAX PROJECT (Preliminary Draft No. 71 1951), at 195
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704(c) was put in place at the time in order to provide clarity regarding
allocations with respect to contributed property. The version of section
704(c) put in place in 1954 did not require partnerships to take into account
precontribution gains and losses in making allocations with respect to
contributed property at all. Instead, section 704(c)(1) at the time provided:
General Rule. In determining a partner's distributive share of
items described in section 702(a), depreciation, depletion, or gain
or loss with respect to property contributed to the partnership by a
partner shall, except to the extent otherwise provided in paragraph
(2) or (3), be allocated among the partners in the same manner as if
such property had been purchased by the partnership.
37
By giving partnerships the option of ignoring entirely precontribution gains
and losses, section 704(c)(1) created an extreme form of the misallocations
that flow from the ceiling rule. Take the facts of Example 1, for instance.
Under section 704(c)(1), when Property A was sold for $150, the
partnership could split both the book and tax gain equally between A and B.
Doing so would fail to take into account precontribution gains and losses
entirely, and would result in misallocations of income, gain, loss, and
deduction as between contributing and noncontributing partners.
In contrast, the 1954 version of section 704(c)(2) allowed partnerships
the option of taking into account precontribution gains and losses when
making allocations with respect to contributed property. 38 Specifically,
section 704(c)(2) provided:
Effect of partnership agreement. If the partnership agreement so
provides, depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with respect to
property contributed to the partnership by a partner shall, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, be shared among the
partners so as to take account of the variation between the basis of
the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time
of contribution.
39
("Probably no other problem has seemed as difficult of resolution as that of the proper
treatment of depreciation and gains and losses in respect of contributed property.").
17 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1) (1954).
38 The House version of section 704(c) only contained the general rule that ultimately
became incorporated in section 704(c)(1). The Senate amendment added the optional section
704(c)(2) provision. H.R. REP. No. 83-2543, at 58 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5280, 5319.
" I.R.C. § 704(c)(2) (1954).
2014]
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This optional section 704(c)(2) left open the question of what allocation
method should be used "to take account of the variation between the basis
of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time of its
contribution." 40 The legislative history of section 704(c)(2) suggested that
the traditional method, with the ceiling rule, should apply under section
704(c)(2). 4 1 As a result, even under section 704(c)(2), application of the
ceiling rule could result in misallocations of income, gain, loss, and
deduction as a result of failure to fully take into account precontribution
gains and losses.
The drafters of the 1954 version of section 704(c) and partnership tax
experts at the time were aware that ignoring precontribution gains and
losses would result in misallocations of income, gain, loss, and deduction.
Their concern was dampened by a number of beliefs they held about the
misallocations. First, the drafters of section 704(c) and partnership tax
experts at the time believed that such misallocations affected only the
partners, and did not impact government revenue. The Senate Report states
quite plainly that "this is not a matter involving revenue considerations to
the Government."4 2 A 1954 American Law Institute draft (1954 ALI Draft)
produced by esteemed tax experts (including the likes of Stanley Surrey)
also suggested that distribution of tax burdens among partners was really an
issue for the partners, not of particular importance to the Treasury
Department.4 3 The 1954 ALI Draft described a situation in which one
partner contributed cash of $100 and the other partner contributed property
with a basis of $20 and a fair market value of $100. The 1954 ALI Draft
examined the potential overtaxation to the cash contributor and
undertaxation to the property contributor, but suggested that the property
contributor could compensate the cash contributor for the tax savings
transferred to the property contributor. Notably, the 1954 ALI Draft did not
consider the potential loss of revenue to the government. 44
The drafters of the 1954 version of section 704(c) and partnership tax
experts at the time also assumed that the misallocations generally would be
perfectly unwound upon liquidation or sale of a partner's interest in the
partnership. For instance, a 1954 Senate report on the topic acknowledged
that failure to take into account precontribution gains and losses "may result
in possible detriment (or gain) to noncontributing partners," but explained
40 Id.
41 S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 381-82 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5022-23 (providing an example in which the depreciation for the noncontributor was limited
by the amount of basis the partnership held in the contributed property).
42 Id. at 93, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4725-26.
43 1954 ALI Draft, supra note 36, at 112, 132-33.
44 Id. at 125.
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that "there will, in general, be a corresponding loss (or gain) to such
partners upon sale or disposition of their interest in the partnership. ' 5 In
the example used in the Senate Report, the liquidation or sale actually
would not offset the prior misallocation perfectly, as a result of a permanent
conversion in character of income on unwinding. The Senate Report did
not pick up on or discuss the issue, instead relying on the general
assumption of a loss (or gain) on sale or disposition of a partner's interest,
which would offset the prior detriment (or gain).46 The 1954 ALl Draft
similarly indicated that "at the point of liquidation or sale the tax
advantages and disadvantages [of the misallocations] are corrected" because
the high-basis cash contributor would reduce his or her gain on liquidation
or sale and that the reverse would occur for the low-basis property
contributor. 7 While the 1954 ALI Draft indicated that the unwinding may
occur far in the future and that there may be limitations on the use of capital
losses, it nonetheless assumed that the unwindings would occur on
liquidation or sale, and that gain and loss on unwinding would otherwise
offset the prior misallocations.
48
B. 1984: Partial Evolution of Section 704(c)
By 1984, Congress had corrected one of its prior misconceptions by
realizing that misallocations of income, gain, loss, and deduction could cost
the government revenue because of potential shifting of tax liability to
lower tax bracket partners (inter-partner shifting). Accordingly, Congress
partially revised section 704(c) in 1984. Congress eliminated prior section
704(c)(1) and required partnerships to take into account variation between
basis and fair market value on contribution.
45 S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 380 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5022.
46 The Senate Report set forth an example in which the partners split depreciation from
a contributed property, resulting in less depreciation to the noncontributor than would have
occurred had the noncontributor been treated as purchasing a half interest in the depreciable
property for cash. After recognition of capital gain on sale of the property and liquidation,
the noncontributor recognizes a capital loss on liquidation. Part of the capital loss
compensates for the reduced depreciation that the noncontributor was allocated. Hence, the
reduced ordinary depreciation deductions are ultimately remedied, but in the form of a
capital loss. The report does not pick up on or discuss the potential conversion issue. Rather,
it rests on the general statement that "there will, in general, be a corresponding loss (or gain)
to such partners upon sale or disposition of their interest in the partnership." Id. A similar
example and similar issues exist in the report's discussion of section 704(c)(2). Id. at 381-83
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5023-24. The House Report similarly relies
on this example and similarly does not address the conversion. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at
224 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4363-64.
47 1954 ALI Draft, supra note 36, at 126.
48 Id. at 126-27.
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Congress did not revisit or revise its prior assumption of perfect
unwinding however. As a result, Congress did not focus on the extensive
delays and character shifts that could occur on unwinding. Congress also
did not fully revise section 704(c) to eliminate the misallocations entirely.
Congress left open the possibility for continuing misallocations by not
eliminating the ceiling rule. This intermediate change in the law (with
reduced, but not eliminated misallocations) seems to reflect the intermediate
understanding that Congress had reached about the misallocations by 1984.
To understand Congress's realization about inter-partner shifting, take
the facts from Example 1. After contribution, the partnership balance sheet
was:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 100 100 A 50 100 50
Property A 50 100 B 100 100 100
Total 150 200 Total 150 200 150
If the old section 704(c)(1) applied, all gain on sale of Property A
would be split equally between A and B, for both book and tax purposes.
When Property A is sold, there is $50 of gain for book purposes, split
equally between them, or $25 each. There is $100 of gain for tax purposes,
which would be split equally between them, or $50 each. As a result, the
partnership balance sheet after sale would be:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 250 250 A 100 125 100
B 150 125 150
Total 250 250 Total 250 250 250
In this situation, A actually experienced a total of $75 of economic gain
over the life of Property A, $50 of which occurred prior to contribution of
Property A to the partnership, and $25 of which occurred after the
contribution. B actually experienced a total of $25 of economic gain over
the life of Property A, all of which occurred after the contribution of
Property A to the partnership. As a result, by failing to take into account
precontribution gain in Property A, section 704(c)(1) would include $25 too
little gain for A for tax purposes and include $25 too much gain for B for
tax purposes. The drafters of section 704(c) and partnership tax experts in
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1954 had viewed such misallocations as irrelevant for government revenue
because the misallocation of too little gain to A is matched exactly by the
misallocation of too much gain to B.
That simplistic view falls apart when taking into account differing tax
rates and the time value of money of deferring tax liability. In the extreme,
imagine that A is in the 35% tax bracket and B is tax-exempt. In such a case,
A's tax liability is reduced by $8.75 ($25 x 35%) as a result of the
misallocation of tax gain to B, even though B's tax liability does not
increase as a result of the misallocation. Even to the extent that the
undertaxation of A and overtaxation of B would be unwound on liquidation
or sale of their partnership interests, the correction would occur after the
original misallocation.
Time value of money principles dictate that deferring tax liability
generally benefits taxpayers and hurts the government, because the
taxpayers, and not the government, have the use of the money in the interim
and can earn a return. As a result, by deferring tax liability, taxpayers would
end up with money left over after investing the tax savings upfront and
paying tax liability later.49 In the context of section 704(c), the partners
could reduce the joint, expected cost of their tax liability by shifting greater
gain (or lower loss) to lower tax bracket partners upfront, in exchange for
unwinding at a later point in time.
The legislative history in 1984 makes clear that Congress by this time
had realized the costs from inter-partner shifting. In examining section
704(c), the Senate Report, House Report, and Joint Committee Report
explicitly focused on the potential for partners to shift tax consequences
between partners of different tax brackets. They explained that "a partner to
whom gain could have been shifted in the absence of the Act's provisions
could be tax-exempt, could have a lower marginal rate than the contributing
partner, or could have expiring net operating loss carryovers." 5° That
realization was central to the elimination of former section 704(c)(1) in
1984."'
On the other hand, the original assumption regarding perfect unwinding
proved more durable. In discussing the possible shifting of losses that could
result from misallocations under section 704(c), the Senate and Joint
49 For a good description of this standard view, see Christopher H. Hanna, The Real
Value of Tax Deferral, 61 FLA. L. REV. 203, 222-24 (2009).
50 S. REP. No. 98-169, at 214 (1984); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984, at 212 (Comm. Print 1984); H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1209 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 875-76.
1 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1209 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 875-
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Committee Reports explained that "the pre-contribution loss would be
effectively reallocated to the contributing partner" when the interests in the
partnership were liquidated or sold.52 The legislative history did not
otherwise address or challenge this standard assumption.
A 1984 ALI project regarding Subchapter K incorporated a slightly
more advanced understanding. The 1984 ALI project started out with a
standard example that assumed perfect unwinding (Basic Example): Partner
A contributes Blackacre, which had a basis of 0 and a fair market value of
$1,000. Partner B contributes $1,000 cash. After contribution, the
partnership balance sheet is as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 1000 1000 A 0 1000 0
Blackacre 0 1000 B 1000 1000 1000
Total 1000 2000 Total 1000 2000 1000
Blackacre is later sold by the partnership for $1,000. Thereafter, the
partnership is liquidated and each of A and B receive $1,000 cash. In this
case, under old section 704(c)(1), $500 of A's built-in gain would be shifted
to B on the sale of Blackacre. As a result, B would end up with $500 too
much gain (which is presumably capital gain) and A would end up with
$500 too little gain (which is presumably capital gain). The partnership
balance sheet at this time would appear as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 2000 2000 A 500 1000 500
B 1500 1000 1500
Total 2000 2000 Total 2000 2000 2000
On liquidation, B would recognize a $500 capital loss, which would
offset the earlier capital gain, and A would recognize $500 capital gain,
which would offset the capital gain previously shifted to B.53 While the
Basic Example displays the longstanding assumption of perfect unwinding,
52 S. Rep. No. 98-169, at 214 (1984); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984, at 212 (Comm. Print 1984).
53 AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER K, at 127
(1984).
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the 1984 ALI project also briefly mentioned situations in which perfect
unwinding may not occur. A footnote stated that if property, rather than
cash, were distributed on liquidation, the unwinding would be delayed
because the partners would not recognize the offsetting gain and loss on
liquidation. 54 The 1984 ALI project also mentioned that if depreciation
were misallocated, an ultimate capital gain or loss on unwinding would not
perfectly offset the prior misallocations, because the offsetting capital gain
and loss would be of a different character. 55 Nonetheless, unlike with inter-
partner shifting, a changing understanding regarding the perfect unwinding
assumption did not take center stage in the rethinking of section 704(c) in
1984. Despite some recognition of problems with the perfect unwinding
assumption by the 1984 ALI project, in making changes to section 704(c) in
1984 Congress did not appear to focus on the possibilities of: (1) unwinding
not occurring on liquidation, and / or (2) character shifts occurring at the
time that the ceiling rule misallocation was ultimately unwound ("extended
delays and character shifts").
In some ways mirroring its intermediate evolution in thought regarding
the section 704(c) allocations, Congress eliminated prior section 704(c)(1),
thereby reducing the incidence of, but not eliminating, possible
misallocation. As a result, partners could no longer ignore entirely the built-
in gain and loss on contribution. Instead, Congress implemented as the new
rule the current provision, which states:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary-
income, gain, loss, and deduction with respect to property
contributed to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among
the partners so as to take account of the variation between the basis
of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the
time of contribution.
56
Even with the change, Congress did not eliminate the possibility of
misallocations in 1984 because it did not eliminate the ceiling rule from the
new section 704(c) regime. The legislative history of the 1984 changes to
section 704(c) seemed to contemplate that the ceiling rule would continue
to apply. As discussed previously, the ceiling rule applied under section
704(c)(2) prior to 1984. Both the House Report and the conference report
in 1984 stated that the regulations for the new law "generally will provide
14 Id. at 127 n. 1.
" Id. at 128.
56 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A).
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for the same result that is achieved under present law." 57 These statements
suggested that the ceiling rule would remain in place. 58 At the least, the
1984 legislative changes left open the possibility that the ceiling rule would
continue to apply under the new section 704(c) regime. When the Treasury
Department eventually issued regulations regarding the new section 704(c)
regime, it retained the traditional method accompanied by the ceiling rule as
one of the permissible methods.
Commentators have suggested that the Treasury Department did so
because, perhaps in part based on the legislative history fleshed out above,
it did not believe it had the authority to overrule the ceiling rule. 59 In any
event, the 1984 changes to section 704(c) ended up being a partial
evolution. They reduced the incidence of misallocations, but allowed them
to continue as a result of retaining the traditional method with the ceiling
rule as a permissible allocation method under section 704(c). This partial
evolution in the state of section 704(c) in 1984 reflected and perhaps arose
out of the partial evolution in understanding. While Congress had realized
the inter-partner shifting costs that the misallocations created, Congress did
not appear to reexamine its earlier assumption of perfect unwinding.
C. Post 1984: A Mixed Bag
Partnership tax experts since 1984 have continued to rely, at least to
some extent, on the perfect unwinding assumption, despite having
examined various situations in which perfect unwinding does not occur.
Partnership tax experts sometimes implicitly assume perfect unwinding on
sale or liquidation of a partner's interest. 60  Other times, partnership tax
57 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1209 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 875-76;
H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 855 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1543.
58 There is some argument to be made that Congress was not fully aware that existing
law would result in misallocations. After explaining its anticipation that the new regulations
"generally will provide for the same result that is achieved under present law when a
partnership elects [to apply section 704(c)(2)]," the conference report stated, "Thus, it will
not be possible to shift built-in gain or loss from the contributing partner to the other
partners." H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 855 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1543.
This latter statement is either misleading or wrong. For the reasons illustrated previously, the
ceiling rule (which applied under existing section 704(c)(2)) created possible misallocations
of gain from the contributing partner to other partners. By both stating that the same results
should be reached under the new section 704(c) regime and that such a regime would
prevent misallocations, the report potentially reflected some misunderstanding about the role
of the ceiling rule in the section 704(c) regime.
59 See, e.g., Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), supra note 34, at 116-17.
60 See, e.g., Monroe, supra note 34, at 1402-03 (discussing how delay between
misallocations and unwinding on sale or liquidation can be costly for government, but not
contemplating extended delays or character shifts).
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experts assume pieces of the perfect unwinding story. For instance, they
may focus on liquidation as an unwinding opportunity (without mentioning
possible extended delays or character shifts),6 ' or suggest that the
misallocations will be offset only on liquidation or sale of a partner's
interest in the partnership.
62
Partnership tax experts have also continued to make use of the same
type of Basic Example set forth in 1984, and even before that, in 1954, in
describing the operation of section 704(c) and the ceiling rule. Post-1984
iterations of the Basic Example involve the formation of a partnership by
two partners, through the contribution of property (Property A) by one
partner (who we can call A) and the contribution of cash by the other
partner (who we can call B). Property A has built-in capital gain. Sometime
after the contributions, the partnership sells Property A and recognizes gain
for tax purposes, but a loss for book purposes. As a result, on sale of the
property the application of the ceiling rule results in A being undertaxed and
B being overtaxed, relative to book. Sometime after the sale, the partnership
liquidates. On liquidation, the partnership distributes to A and B the
original cash contributed by B plus the cash now held by the partnership as
a result of the sale of Property A. The liquidation results in capital gain to
A and capital loss to B. As a result, the liquidation perfectly offsets the
earlier ceiling rule misallocations. 63 While sometimes even partnership tax
experts who rely on variations of this Basic Example also offer slight
complications, 64 the Basic Example and the assumption of perfect
unwinding historically at the heart of it persist.
61 See, e.g., Howard E. Abrams, Dealing with the Contribution of Property to a
Partnership Part I, 1 No. 6 Bus. ENTITIES 16, 19-20 (exploring how "book/tax disparities...
will remain until the partnership is liquidated"). Abrams is technically correct that book/tax
disparities will, indeed, be eliminated upon liquidation, because there will be no more book
and tax accounts. But to the extent that the liquidation does not result in gain or loss
offsetting the prior gain or loss misallocations, the elimination of the book/tax disparities
will not offset the prior misallocations. Hence, this is a good example of a technically true
statement, which nonetheless seems to rely to some extent on the perfect unwinding
assumption, or at least not challenge it directly. As a result, the statement, while true,
continues the viability of the perfect unwinding assumption).
62 Michael G. Frankel et al., Final Allocation Regulations Still Permit Planning to
Avoid Impact of the Ceiling Rule, 80 J. TAX'N 271, 276 (1994) (recognizing, though not
discussing, potential character shifts and looking to liquidation and sale as the moment of
unwinding).
63 See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 TAX L. REV. 547, 561-62
(1986) (making use of such an example).
64 For instance, after setting forth the Basic Example, described above, Lokken notes
that misallocations of depreciation may be corrected with a capital gain or loss on
liquidation. Id. at 563-64 n.38. As suggested previously, this set of facts would result in the
conversion of character of income.
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On one level, relying on aspects of the perfect unwinding assumption
and variations of the Basic Example in order to describe the operation of
section 704(c) and the ceiling rule is entirely reasonable. Section 704(c) is
extremely complex. Describing it at a basic level means omitting many
complications. Additionally, in order to focus on any particular aspect of
section 704(c), it is often necessary to make simplifying assumptions about
other aspects of the provision.65  It is also worth emphasizing that when
partnership tax experts use the Basic Example, the analysis (assuming the
facts given) is entirely correct. The assumption of perfect unwinding and
the Basic Example, therefore, can play a valuable role in making
description and analysis regarding an extraordinarily complicated provision
tractable. Nonetheless, on another level, the continuing reliance on aspects
of the perfect unwinding assumption and variations on the Basic Example
can begin to obscure a more complex reality.66
65 Cf John D. Steines, Jr., Partnership Allocations of Built-In Gain or Loss, 45 TAX L.
REV. 615, 647 (1990) ("The inherent complexity of analyzing built-in items demands
unrealistically simple illustrations, such as the basic hypothetical where C contributes
appreciated property and D contributes cash.").
66 The Basic Example is actually so oversimplified that it is questionable whether the
so-called partnership often described in the Basic Example would qualify as a partnership at
all. In section 761(a), a partnership is defined as "any business, financial operation, or
venture." The code section elaborates that the Secretary may exclude an organization from
partnership tax treatment "if it is availed of... for investment purposes only and not for the
active conduct of a business." I.R.C. § 761(a)(1). A long line of cases attempts to flesh out
this definition. The touchstone for a partnership under this line of cases has been, "whether,
considering all the facts ... the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose
intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise." Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). More recently, the so-called "check-the-box
regulations," which govern choice of entity classifications, have added that in order to be
able to qualify as a partnership for tax purposes, an organization must first qualify as a
"separate entity for federal tax purposes." To qualify as a "separate entity for federal tax
purposes," the participants must "carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture
and divide the profits therefrom." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (2013). The regulations
elaborate that "mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented
or leased does not constitute a separate entity for federal tax purposes." Id. The so-called
"partnership" in the Basic Example does not seem to "carry on" a business and may or may
not constitute the conduct of an enterprise. On liquidation, the only cash that the partnership
distributes is the original cash contributed by B and the cash obtained through sale of
Property A. This suggests that the partnership's sole function appears to be a sale of Property
A, followed by liquidation. The simplification at the heart of the Basic Example thereby
threatens to render the "partnership" in the Basic Example not even a partnership at all for
tax purposes. In a way, then, the simplification that the Basic Example relies upon to help
make the analysis tractable is so great that it becomes questionable how useful the Basic
Example really is for real world partnerships.
[Vol. 34:63
Unwinding the Ceiling Rule
To be sure, partnership tax experts since 1984 have also, to varying
degrees, recognized that the ceiling rule misallocations might not be
unwound on liquidation or sale of a partnership interest. For instance,
partnership tax experts have suggested that the offsetting gain or loss on
liquidation may not be of the same character as the original misallocation.
67
These discussions have often focused on situations in which the original
misallocation is ordinary, and the ultimate reversal is capital.68 Some
partnership tax experts have provided more detailed examinations. For
instance, R. Donald Turlington explored, to some extent, how the
unwindings will not necessarily occur on liquidation, and the possible
conversion of too much capital gain into eventual ordinary loss. 69 All of
these discussions by partnership tax experts have been important. The
common assumption of perfect unwinding nevertheless has continued
alongside these discussions. And there is more to the story than what has
been examined thus far.
IV. UNWINDING THE CEILING RULE MISALLOCATIONS
This part sets forth in detail the situations in which the perfect
unwinding assumption may not apply. The many possibilities reveal that
whether or not the ceiling rule misallocations are unwound on liquidation or
sale of a partnership interest depends on: (1) a variety of relatively arbitrary
67 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 164
(5th ed. 1998) ("B's loss on liquidation or sale of his partnership interest would be a capital
loss while the gain on the sale of the depreciable property might be ordinary as a result of
depreciation recapture."); RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 115, 117-18
(2008) (explaining that "the character of the gain and loss recognized on liquidation could be
different than that associated with the land and the liquidation may occur years after
disposition of the land"); Gregory Marich & William McKee, Sections 704(c) and 743(b):
The Shortcomings of Existing Regulations and the Problems of Publicly Traded
Partnerships, 41 TAX L. REV. 627, 640-41 (1986) [hereinafter Shortcomings of Existing
Regulations] ("When the partnership is liquidated or the partners sell their partnership
interests, shifts of built-in gain attributable to ceiling rule limitations of depreciation or
depletion may finally be corrected, but at the cost of potentially significant timing and
character distortions."); ARTHUR B. WILLIS & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION 10-135 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing how "the disposition of the partnership interest
could result in capital gain or loss, whereas a sale of, or depreciation, or amortization of, the
contributed property could have resulted in ordinary income or deduction").
68 See WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, supra note 67; see also YIN &
BURKE, supra note 34, at 166 ("[T]he reversal may be imperfect once income character is
taken into account. The initial income shift may be of ordinary income or loss, whereas the
reversed amount of gain or loss is almost always capital in nature.).
69 See, e.g., Donald Turlington, Section 704(c) and Partnership Book-Tax Disparities,
The Ceiling Rule and the Art of Tax Avoidance, 46 INST. ON FED. TAx'N § 26-21 (1988).
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facts regarding the assets held by the partnership on either liquidation or
sale, and (2) the unintended interactions of inordinately complicated
partnership tax rules. The result is a somewhat haphazard system of
taxation.
A. Liquidations
As an initial matter, it is worth emphasizing that unwinding on
liquidation is actually the statutory exception, rather than the rule. Section
731(a)(1) dictates that on distribution to a partner, gain shall not be
recognized, except to the extent that any money distributed exceeds the
partner's outside basis in the partnership, immediately prior to the
distribution. 70 Section 731(a)(2) dictates that a partner shall not recognize
loss on receipt of a distribution, except if no property other than money or
unrealized receivables or inventory is distributed.7 ' In such a case, the
partner may recognize loss to the extent that the partner's outside basis in
the partnership prior to the distribution exceeds the sum of the money
distributed and the basis of the unrealized receivables and inventory. 72
Ceiling rule misallocations to a partner can be unwound on liquidation of
that partner only to the extent that gain or loss is recognized on liquidation
of that partner. As a result, only in the limited circumstances in which the
statute permits gain or loss to be recognized on liquidation will the ceiling
rule misallocations be unwound on liquidation.
For instance, take Example 3, as set forth above. After the partnership
sold Property A, it had $150: $50 from the sale of Property A, and $100
from partner B's original contribution. There had also been a ceiling rule
misallocation, whereby partner A had recognized $25 too little gain for tax
purposes, and partner B had recognized $25 too little loss for tax purposes.
After the sale of Property A, the partnership balance sheet appeared as
follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 150 150 A 50 75 50
B 100 75 100
Total 150 150 Total 150 150 150
70 I.R.C. § 731 (a)(1).
71 I.R.C. § 731(a)(2).
72 id.
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Of course, given this set of facts, if the partnership immediately
liquidated and distributed the cash (which would occur in the Basic
Example often used to describe section 704(c)), the misallocations would be
offset. This would occur because, immediately prior to liquidation, A has
an outside basis of $50 and B has an outside basis of $100. 73 When they
each receive $75 on liquidation of the partnership, A would recognize a $25
gain and B would recognize a $25 loss, which would offset the prior
misallocation. The respective gain and loss would be capital,74 ensuring
perfect unwinding if Property A is a capital asset.
In the case of any number of alternative sets of facts, the misallocation
would not actually be unwound on liquidation. Beginning with partner B,
imagine that the partnership had used cash to purchase another capital asset
(Property B). If the partnership distributed Property B to partner B, partner
B would not recognize gain or loss on liquidation. Rather, B would take a
basis in Property B equal to B's outside basis in the partnership
immediately prior to the distribution. 75  As a result, the misallocation
occurring from the ceiling rule would not be unwound on liquidation.
Instead, it would be preserved in Property B and the misallocation may not
be unwound until sale of Property B, potentially resulting in an extensive
delay in unwinding.
If the partnership distributes either inventory or unrealized receivables,
any number of outcomes might occur, and only by happenstance would the
misallocation be offset by the correct amount of loss on liquidation.
Imagine, for instance, that the partnership used the $150 it had after sale of
Property A to purchase a number of items of inventory. 76 If the partnership
distributes to B inventory with a basis equal to or greater than B's outside
basis of $100, B will take a basis of $100 in such inventory. 77 As a result,
just as with the distribution of a capital asset, B will not recognize a loss on
liquidation. Instead, the loss will be preserved in the inventory, potentially
resulting in an extensive delay in unwinding.
Perhaps more interestingly, if the partnership distributes to B inventory
with a basis less than $75, B would actually recognize more loss on
liquidation than necessary to offset the ceiling rule misallocation, and this
greater loss may not correspond with a real economic loss. For instance,
imagine that the value of B's partnership interest has not changed since the
" I.R.C. § 722.
74 I.R.C. § 73 1(a).
71 I.R.C. § 732(b).
76 All of the cash is being turned into inventory to eliminate complexities presented by
section 751 (b).
77 I.R.C. § 732(b), (c).
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sale of Property A. As a result, B is still entitled to a distribution worth $75
from an economic perspective. The partnership purchased a number of
different items of inventory after the sale of Property A, including both
inventory that appreciated in value and inventory that depreciated in value.
The partnership distributes inventory that appreciated in value to B on
liquidation. The inventory has a basis of $10 and a value of $75. In this
situation, B will recognize a loss of $90 on distribution of the inventory on
liquidation. 78 Partner B will recognize such a loss because B cannot inflate
the basis of the inventory on liquidation. 79
After the liquidation, B will hold the inventory worth $75 with a basis
of $10. On eventual sale of the inventory (assuming the inventory retains
its value of $75), B would recognize a gain of $65. The $65 gain minus the
$90 loss would net out to the $25 loss necessary to offset the original
ceiling rule misallocation. The ultimate, correct result, however, would not
occur until eventual sale of the inventory, again resulting in a potential,
extensive delay. In this particular instance, the liquidation would actually
result in an inflated loss, relative to the correct loss necessary to offset the
ceiling rule misallocation.
80
If, instead, the partnership distributed to B inventory with a basis of
more than $75 but less than $100, B would recognize a loss on liquidation,
but not the full $25 loss necessary to offset the prior ceiling rule
misallocation. 81 The remainder of the $25 loss would be preserved in the
inventory and deferred until eventual sale of the inventory. The only way B
would recognize the exact $25 loss necessary to offset the ceiling rule
misallocation on liquidation would be if B were to receive inventory (or a
combination of inventory, unrealized receivables, and cash) with basis of
exactly $75. While certainly possible, this outcome is just one possibility
among many.
A very similar set of possibilities exists with respect to the liquidation
of partner A, although there is arguably an even smaller chance of
unwinding on liquidation for A because the possibility of gain recognition
on liquidation is even smaller than the possibility of loss recognition. If the
partnership acquires and then distributes a capital asset to partner A, the
outcome is the mirror image of what would happen as a result of a property
distribution to partner B. Partner A would take a basis in the capital asset
78 I.R.C. § 731(a)(2).
79 Id.
80 The cost of the accelerated loss in this case, offset by later gain, would be that the
loss would be capital and would be offset by ordinary income on sale. I.R.C. § 731(a).
Character conversion issues are discussed in the text to follow. For now, it is worthwhile to
focus on when unwinding would actually occur on liquidation.
81 I.R.C. § 731(a)(2).
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equal to A's outside basis immediately prior to liquidation, 82 and the ceiling
rule misallocation would be perpetuated until eventual sale of the capital
asset.
Unlike with partner B, a distribution of inventory or unrealized
receivables would never offset the prior ceiling rule misallocation to partner
A, because a distribution of inventory and unrealized receivables cannot
result in gain recognition.83  Indeed, the distribution of inventory or
unrealized receivables with a basis less than A's outside basis immediately
prior to the distribution may result in loss to A. 84 The prior ceiling rule
misallocation would persist.
Furthermore, the additional loss recognized on liquidation, which may
not reflect an economic loss, may also have to be offset at a later point in
time. For instance, imagine that A's partnership interest remains worth $75
at the time of liquidation. The partnership distributes appreciated inventory
to A, which has a basis of $10 and a fair market value of $75. Partner A
would actually recognize a loss of $40 on the liquidation, which would not
reflect an economic loss. 8 5 Rather, it would reflect the relatively arbitrary
fact that inventory with a basis of $10 was being distributed on liquidation
to a partner who happened to have an outside basis of $50 at the time. In
this circumstance, the ceiling rule misallocation would go uncorrected at
liquidation. The allocation of noneconomic tax loss to A would exacerbate
the ceiling rule misallocation, at least on a temporary basis. 86
The only set of facts that would result in unwinding of the ceiling rule
misallocation on liquidation of partner A would be a distribution of money
in excess of A's outside basis on liquidation.87 Even if money is distributed
to A, the combination of a distribution of money and other property
(including inventory or unrealized receivables) would perpetuate at least
part of the misallocation until later sale or disposition of the other
property.88 In short, to an even greater extent than with partner B, the
actual unwinding of the ceiling rule misallocation on liquidation of partner
82 I.R.C. § 732(b).
83 I.R.C. § 731(a)(1).
84 I.R.C. § 731(a)(2).
85 id.
86 Here, as before with partner B, the cost of the additional loss would be that the loss
would be capital, whereas the future gain would presumably be ordinary.
87 I.R.C. § 731(a)(1). Relief from debt would also be considered a distribution of
money for these purposes. I.R.C. § 752(b).
88 This would occur because, to the extent that other property was distributed, such
property would reduce the money distribution. Only a distribution in cash of the full fair
market value of partner A's partnership interest (i.e., $75) would produce the gain
recognition of $25, as a result of receiving money in excess of outside basis.
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A remains just one possibility. A number of other possibilities exist, in
which the ceiling rule misallocation would not be unwound on liquidation
of partner A.
Moreover, putting aside the potential for extensive delays, possibilities
abound for character shifts on unwinding of the misallocations, either at the
time of the liquidation or sometime after the liquidation. As an initial
matter, there are many straightforward situations that would predictably
create a character mismatch between the original misallocation and the
correcting allocation of income or loss. In perhaps the most straightforward
case, the character of the original misallocation may be ordinary, whereas
the. ultimate correction may be capital.89 Take the facts of Example 4. The
partnership balance sheet after contribution in Example 4 was as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 100 100 A 20 100 20
Property A 20 100 B 100 100 100
Total 120 200 Total 120 200 120
In this example, the noncontributor, partner B, would be allocated $5 a
year of depreciation for book purposes, but only $2 a year of depreciation
for tax purposes. As a result, over the life of the property, B would take $30
too little depreciation for tax purposes, relative to the book result. Partner A
would correspondingly fail to take into account $30 of the built-in gain in
Property A over the life of the property. If the partnership eventually
liquidated the partners with only cash, the liquidation would produce capital
loss for partner B and capital gain for partner A.90 The foregone tax
depreciation deductions, however, would have been ordinary deductions to
B.91 Any foregone depreciation deductions to A (and possible recapture on
the property if the property were sold) would also be ordinary in nature.92
As a result, B recognized too little ordinary deductions over the life of the
property, and A recognized too little ordinary income. To the extent that a
cash liquidation occurs, the ordinary misallocations would be offset by
capital gain or loss.
89 As noted previously, this situation is the one that has received the most attention
thus far by partnership tax experts.
90 I.R.C. § 73 1(a).
9' I.R.C. § 167.
92 I.R.C. §§ 167, 1245.
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Of course, various other possible outcomes exist after the ceiling rule
misallocation in Example 4, and only in some of these other possibilities
would a character shift occur. For instance, if the partnership acquires all
ordinary income property 93 and distributes such property on liquidation, the
gain or loss ultimately recognized by the partners on sale of the property
would be ordinary. In such a case, the character shift would not occur. If,
instead, the partnership were to acquire all property that would produce a
capital gain or loss, then a distribution of such property to the partners on
liquidation would eventually yield a character conversion. To make matters
even more complicated, property that is ordinary income property to the
partnership may be capital gain or loss property to the partners, and vice
versa.94 For instance, even if the partnership acquires property that is
inventory in the partnership's hands, if the partner is not a dealer in such
property, the property may produce capital gain or loss in the partner's
hands. As a result, even if the partnership acquires property that is
inventory in the partnership's hands, if the partnership distributes the
property to a partner on liquidation and the partner waits more than five
years to sell the property, the partner may recognize capital gain or loss on
the sale. 95 In such a case, if the earlier misallocation was a misallocation of
depreciation, a conversion of character would again occur.
As one might by now imagine, a wide array of possibilities also exists
with respect to Example 3, in which a sale of property created the
misallocation. In Example 3, if Property A were ordinary income property,
then the misallocation resulting from the ceiling rule would be ordinary.
Later distribution of cash or a capital asset would result in an offset that
would be capital.
The flip set of circumstances is also possible. Property A in Example 3
may be a capital asset. After the sale of Property A, the partnership may
purchase all assets that produce ordinary income. 96 Distribution of such
assets on liquidation would mean that the ultimate (albeit, extensively
delayed) unwinding would be ordinary in nature, thereby creating a shift
from capital gain (loss) to ordinary loss (gain). In this context as well,
property that is inventory in the partnership's hands may not be inventory in
93 The assumption of acquisition of all ordinary income property again is made to
eliminate potential complexities from section 751 (b).
94 See I.R.C. § 122 1(a)(1) (excluding from the definition of capital asset "stock in trade
of the taxpayer or other property of a kind that would properly be included in the inventory
of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business").
9' I.R.C. § 735(a)(1).
96 This assumption is again being made so as to eliminate potential complexities from
section 75 1(b).
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the hands of the partner.97 As a result, even if the original misallocation was
ordinary in nature and the partnership distributes property that is inventory
in the partnership's hands, if it is not inventory in the distributee partner's
hands and the distributee partner waits more than five years to sell the
property, there will again be a shift of character.98
The extent to which the ceiling rule misallocation actually gets
unwound without a permanent shift in character of income therefore
depends on an almost overwhelming number of facts, including: (1) what
assets the partnership holds on liquidation, (2) what the partnership
distributes to which partners, (3) what the tax profiles of such partners are
(i.e., whether the partners are dealers or not with respect to various
properties, questions that do not have anything to do with the partnership
itself), and, potentially, (4) how long the partner holds any distributed asset
prior to selling it (which affects whether or not the character of the gain or
loss on sale will be dictated by the character that would have resulted at the
partnership level).99
B. Sales of Partnership Interests
Unlike liquidations, sales of partnership interests will always unwind
prior ceiling rule misallocations. The rules regarding sales of partnership
interests nonetheless can result in conversion of the character of the
allocated income and loss. Moreover, as a result of the combination of the
ceiling rule and the rules regarding sales of partnership interests, the sale of
a partnership interest itself can result in a ceiling rule misallocation.
Character conversion can accompany those misallocations as well. The
application of the ceiling rule on sale of a partnership interest can also
create surprising errors in taxation for the new, purchasing partner.
As an initial matter, while sales of partnership interests always unwind
prior ceiling rule misallocations, the unwindings can yield permanent
character conversions. Imagine, for instance, that W, X, Y, and Z form a
partnership. Partner W contributes inventory, an ordinary income asset with
a basis of $50 and a fair market value of $100 at the time of contribution.
Partner X, partner Y, and partner Z each contributes cash of $100. Each of
the partners has a 25% interest in profits, losses, and capital of the
partnership. The partnership balance sheet after the contributions is as
follows:
9' I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1).
98 I.R.C. § 735(a)(1).
99 As intimated previously, gain or loss on the sale of inventory only retains its
character as ordinary income if sold or exchanged within five years of the distribution. I.R.C.
§ 735(a)(1).
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ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 300 300 W 50 100 50
Inventory 50 100 X 100 100 100
Y 100 100 100
z 100 100 100
Total 350 400 Total 350 400 350
The partnership then sells its inventory for $80. If the partnership
applies the traditional method for making section 704(c) allocations, the
ceiling rule will apply on sale. W, X, Y, and Z will each be allocated a $5
loss for book purposes.'00 Partner W, however, will be allocated a $30 gain
for tax purposes. 1 1 This will understate by $15 the gain W has actually
experienced over the life of Inventory from an economic perspective. X, Y,
and Z will not be allocated any tax loss. As a result, each will be allocated
$5 too little tax loss, relative to the loss they experienced from an economic
perspective. Since the relevant property is ordinary income property, W, the
contributing partner, has been allocated too little ordinary gain and the
noncontributing partners have been allocated too little ordinary loss. The
partnership balance sheet after the sale is as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 380 380 W 80 95 80
X 100 95 100
Y 100 95 100
Z 100 95 100
Total 380 380 Total 380 380 380
Now imagine that the partnership uses the $80 cash from the sale of its
inventory to purchase a capital asset, Property C, and that Property C
retains its value of $80 until the time that W sells her partnership interest.
The partnership balance sheet appears as follows at the time that W sells her
partnership interest.
1oo See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(2), ex. (1)(iii) (2013).
101 Id.
2014]
Virginia Tax Review
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 300 300 W 80 95 80
Property C 80 80 X 100 95 100
Y 100 95 100
Z 100 95 100
Total 380 380 Total 380 380 380
Partner W sells her partnership interest to N for $95, reflecting W's
one-fourth interest in the $300 cash and Property C. The rules governing
sales of partnership interests dictate that the selling partner, W, must
determine what, if any, of her amount received on sale of her partnership
interest is attributable to inventory or unrealized receivables (both of which
produce ordinary income). 102 To the extent that any of W's amount received
is attributable to inventory or unrealized receivables, the money or fair
market value received is considered received in exchange for ordinary
income property. 10 3 The remainder of the amount received is considered
received in exchange for a capital asset. 
104
In this case, the partnership holds no inventory or unrealized
receivables at the time of the sale of W's interest to N, so there would be no
amounts received attributable to such items. The entire gain or loss on sale
of W's partnership interest to N would be capital. As a result, the earlier
misallocation of too little ordinary gain to W would be converted to capital
gain. The mirror image of this result would apply if any of the
noncontributors were the selling partner. The earlier misallocations of too
little ordinary loss to the noncontributors would be converted into capital
loss on the sale of any of their partnership interests.
Even if the partnership held inventory or unrealized receivables at the
time of the sale of any of the partners' interests to N, the character
conversion would still occur. In order to determine the amount of any gain
or loss that is characterized as ordinary on the sale of a partner's interest,
one must imagine a hypothetical sale of all inventory and unrealized
receivables (section 751(a) property) immediately prior to the selling
partner's transfer of her partnership interest.10 5 Any gain or loss allocable to
the selling partner from such sale is ordinary gain or loss to the selling
10' See I.R.C. § 751(a), (c), (d).
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(1) (2013).
104 Id.
105 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (2004).
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partner. 106 It is not enough, then, for the partnership to hold section 75 1(a)
property on sale of a partner's interest in order for ordinary income or loss
to result. Rather, there must be gain or loss built into such property at the
time of sale. To the extent that any ordinary income or loss is built into any
ordinary income property purchased by the partnership, the resulting
ordinary income or loss would reflect the separate gain or loss in such
ordinary income property.
Taking into account such gain or loss would not correct the prior
ceiling rule misallocation. Instead, by taking the hypothetical sale approach
and viewing any remaining gain or loss as capital, the rules governing sales
of partnership interests systematically convert ordinary income and loss
ceiling rule misallocations into capital gain or loss on sales of partnership
interests. There is no obvious reason for such conversion. Rather, it results
from the disconnect between the rules governing character determination
for the sale of the property subject to the ceiling rule (which focus on the
specific property being sold)10 7 and the rules governing sales of partnership
interests (which only require ordinary income or loss to the extent of gain or
loss built into section 751(a) properties held by the partnership at the time
of sale of partnership interest).108
Perhaps more surprisingly, as a result of the interaction between the
ceiling rule and the rules regarding sales of partnership interests, the sale of
a partnership interest itself can create both a ceiling rule misallocation and a
simultaneous character shift. Imagine, for instance, the following fact
pattern. On January 1, 2010, W, X, Y, and Z form a partnership. On
partnership formation, each partner makes the following contributions to
the partnership: W contributes Greenacre, a capital asset; X contributes
inventory; and Y and Z each contributes $900 cash. At the time of
contribution, Greenacre has a basis in W's hands of $900 and a fair market
value of $900 and the inventory has a basis in X's hands of $500 and a fair
market value of $900. Each of the partners has a one-fourth interest in
profits, losses, and capital of the partnership. After the contributions, the
partnership balance sheet appears as follows:
106 Id.
10' See I.R.C. § 702(b) (determining "the character of any item of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit... as if such item were realized directly from the source from which
realized by the partnership").
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.75 1-1(a)(1) (2004).
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ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB)
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 1800 1800 W 900 900 900
Greenacre 900 900 X 500 900 500
Inventory 500 900 Y 900 900 900
Z 900 900 900
Total 3200 3600 Total 3200 3600 3200
A year after partnership formation, at a time at which no material tax
events have occurred in the partnership, X sells X's interest in the
partnership to N for $1225. At the time of the sale, Greenacre has a fair
market value of $2400 and the inventory has a fair market value of $700.
Assume that the partnership applies the traditional method for making
section 704(c) allocations. The partnership balance sheet appears as follows
at this time:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND OUTSIDE
BASIS (OB) AND FMV)' 0 9
Basis Book FMV Tax Book OB FMV
Cash 1800 1800 1800 W 900 900 900 1225
Greenacre 900 900 2400 X 500 900 500 1225
Inventory 500 900 700 Y 900 900 900 1225
Z 900 900 900 1225
Total 3200 3600 4900 Total 3200 3600 3200 4900
In analyzing the outcome of the facts posed above, it is first important
to recognize that X contributed built-in gain to the partnership whereas W,
Y, and Z did not. As a result, partner X should take the built-in gain into
account under section 704(c). W, Y, and Z should not have to take into
account any variation between basis and fair market value prior to
partnership formation.
Combining any built-in gain or loss contributed prior to the partnership
with each partner's share of appreciation or depreciation after the formation
of the partnership reveals what has happened to each partner from an
economic perspective. From an economic perspective, X has experienced a
net increase in the value of the inventory of $350. Prior to the contribution
of the inventory, X experienced an increase in value of the inventory of
$400. After the contribution of inventory, its value declined by $200, and
109 In analyzing the consequences of the sale in this case, it is essential to take into
account fair market value. As a result, a fair market value column has been added to the asset
and capital accounts sides of the balance sheet.
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one-fourth of that decline, or $50, is attributable to X's interest. There has
also been a $1500 increase in the value of Greenacre since the formation of
the partnership, and one-fourth of that increase, or $375, is attributable to
X's interest as well.
W, Y, and Z each experiences a $50 decrease in the value of the
inventory after formation of the partnership ($200 x 25%) and a $375
increase in value in Greenacre ($1500 x 25%). From an economic
perspective, then, X has experienced a $350 increase in the value of the
inventory - a section 751(a), or ordinary income property - and a $375
increase in value in Greenacre, a capital asset. Each of the other partners
has experienced a $50 decline in the value of the inventory - a section
751(a), or ordinary income property - and a $375 increase in value in
Greenacre, a capital asset. In order for the tax consequences to match the
economics,110 X should recognize $350 of ordinary income and $375 of
capital gain on sale of her partnership interest. If, instead, it was one of the
noncontributors selling her partnership interest to N, the noncontributor
should recognize a $50 ordinary loss and $375 of capital gain.
As a result of the combination of the ceiling rule and the rules
governing sales of partnership interests, the correct economic results
discussed above do not occur. When X sells her partnership interest to N, X
first calculates overall gain or loss (as measured by amount realized minus
outside basis). This amount is $725 ($1225 less $500). 111 Partner X then
must take into account as ordinary income any amounts required under
section 751(a), which include X's share of ordinary income from a
hypothetical sale of the inventory."12 Importantly, as a result of application
of the ceiling rule, such amount is limited to $200 for X.1 13 This occurs
110 Readers might notice that at this point the discussion focuses on tax following
economic realities, as opposed to "book." The reason is because sales of partnership interests
are not a point in time at which revaluations of partnership property are permitted. Cf Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f). As a result, strictly speaking, the appreciation and depreciation
in value of the property that occur after formation of the partnership have not yet been
reflected in the books of the partnership. Nonetheless, the economic analysis described in the
text holds. As a result, it is accurate to discuss what would have to happen in order for tax to
follow the economics, which is ultimately the most important analysis. In other situations,
book is just standing in for economics.
111 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (2013).
112 Id.
113 The operative language to determine the amount of gain or loss from the sale of
section 75 1(a) property is:
The income or loss realized by a partner upon the sale or exchange of its interest
in section 751 property is the amount of income or loss from section 751 property
(including any remedial allocations under § 1.704-3(d)) that would have been
2014]
Virginia Tax Review
because the value of Inventory has decreased to $700 since contribution to
the partnership. As a result, only $200 of the original $400 of built-in gain
exists at the partnership level, and only $200 of ordinary income can be
taken into account by Xunder section 75 1(a). The remainder of X's gain on
sale of her partnership interest, or $525, must be capital gain. 114 As a result
of the combination of the ceiling rule and the rules governing sales of
partnership interests, X's $350 of ordinary income and $375 capital gain
from an economic perspective has been turned into $200 of ordinary
income and $525 capital gain. The result is a conversion of $150 ordinary
income to capital gain.
A ceiling rule misallocation and character shift would also occur in the
above example if it were any of the noncontributors who sold the
partnership interest to N. Imagine, for instance, that N purchased the
partnership interest from Z for $1,225. Overall, Z would have a $325 gain
allocated to the partner (to the extent attributable to the partnership interest sold
or exchanged) if the partnership had sold all of its property in a fully taxable
transaction for cash in an amount equal to the fair market value of such property
(taking into account section 7701(g)) immediately prior to the partner's transfer
of the interest in the partnership.
Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (2013) (emphasis added). The language in italics suggests the
possibility of remedial allocations. Remedial allocations would remedy the ceiling rule
limitation. However, the language appears to permit, but not require, remedial allocations,
thereby leaving the possibility of elective ceiling rule misallocations in place. The Treasury
Department's historical view that it did not have authority to override the ceiling rule, see
Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), supra note 34, at 116-17, would seem to
support the view that the Treasury Department has permitted, but not mandated, remedial
allocations in the context of sales of partnership interests. Moreover, the Treasury
Department preamble for the 1999 issuance of the current section 751(a) regulation (which
regulation is set forth above) supports the notion that partnerships can choose, but are not
required to apply remedial allocations for the hypothetical sales that will occur in the context
of sales of partnership interests. The preamble discusses sales of partnership interests and
explains that the partnership's choice of section 704(c) methods will dictate the recovery
period for the purchasing partner's section 743(b) adjustment attributable to built-in gain.
T.D. 8847, 1999-2 C.B. 701, 69,904. The preamble further states, "The IRS and the Treasury
Department believe that under the current regulations under section 704(c), a partnership
may use the remedial method under § 1.704-3, even where it is not readily apparent at the
time the property is contributed that the ceiling rule will be applicable." Id. As such, the
preamble clearly seems to contemplate the partnership's ability to choose a method under
section 704(c) in the context of sales of partnership interests. The language "including any
remedial allocations" seems designed to clarify that the remedial method may be applied on
the hypothetical sale, at the partnership's option. In the preamble to the proposed regulations,
the Treasury Department indicated as much, explaining that "the proposed regulations ...
coordinate sections 743 and 704(c) when partnerships elect the remedial allocation method
under § 1.704-3(d)." 63 Fed. Reg. 4408-01, 1998-1 C.B. 944, 4409-10 (emphasis added).
114 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (2013).
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on the sale of her partnership interests ($1225 sale price less Z's $900
outside basis). 1 5 As discussed previously, for economic purposes Z has
experienced a $50 decline in the value of the inventory, a section 75 1(a), or
ordinary income property, and a $375 increase in value in Greenacre, a
capital asset. In determining what, if any ordinary income gain or loss
partner Z takes into account, the hypothetical sale approach applies. "1
6
If the partnership were to sell all of its property in a fully taxable
transaction for cash immediately prior to the transfer of Z's partnership
interest, the ceiling rule would apply to the sale of the inventory. Although
there has been a loss of $200 for book purposes, there has been a gain of
$200 for tax purposes. As a result, no tax loss can be allocated to Z on the
hypothetical sale of the inventory. Under the rules governing sales of
partnership interests, any gain or loss that is not ordinary under section
751(a) will be capital.' 17 Partner Z, therefore, would recognize a $325
capital gain on sale of her partnership interest. The combination of the
ceiling rule and the rules governing sales of partnership interests has
therefore converted a $50 ordinary loss into a capital loss.
Those results are not intuitive. Only a detailed focus on the interaction
between the ceiling rule and the rules governing sales of partnership
interests reveals those outcomes. Even so, the results are quite difficult to
justify. They can only be explained as the result of unintended interactions
between multiple, complex partnership tax rules. In the case of sales of
partnership interests in particular, the operation of the ceiling rule seems
particularly arbitrary. Normally, the ceiling rule applies when there is an
actual sale of partnership property, and therefore an actual partnership gain
or loss. Under an entity conception of partnership tax, some might view
such partnership gain or loss as limiting the amount of gain or loss that can
be allocated to the partners. In the context of sales of partnership interests,
however, there is no actual sale of the property subject to the ceiling rule.
There is merely a hypothetical sale for the purposes of the rules governing
sales of partnership interests. The value of the property subject to the
ceiling rule at the time of the sale of the partnership interest therefore plays
no role, other than as an arbitrary determination of whether or not the
ceiling rule, and resulting character conversion, will apply. If the value of
the section 751(a) property were such that the property were not ceiling-
rule-limited at the time of the hypothetical sale, the distortions would not
result.
115 I.R.C. § 722.
116 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(1)(2013).
117 Id.
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Indeed, the fact that there is no actual sale of the section 751(a)
property extends the problematic effects of the ceiling rule. The application
of the ceiling rule to the selling partner makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to correctly tax the partners in the partnership on the property going
forward. To understand this outcome, it is easiest to use the following
example, with a very simplified set of facts. W and X form a partnership.
On formation of the partnership, W contributes inventory. At the time of
contribution, the inventory is worth $1000 and has a basis of $500. X
contributes $1000 cash. Each of the partners has a one-half interest in
profits, losses, and capital of the partnership. The partnership applies the
traditional method for making section 704(c) allocations. After the
contributions, the partnership balance sheet appears as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 1000 1000 W 500 1000 500
Inventory 500 1000 X 1000 1000 1000
Total 1500 2000 Total 1500 2000 1500
No material tax events occur in the partnership from the time of the
formation. At a time when the inventory is worth $800, W sells her
partnership interest to N for $900. At this point in time, the partnership
balance sheet is as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND OUTSIDE
BASIS (OB) AND FMV)
Basis Book FMV Tax Book OB FMV
Cash 1000 1000 1000 W 500 1000 500 900
Inventory 500 1000 800 X 1000 1000 1000 900
Total 1500 2000 1800 Total 1500 2000 1500 1800
Partner W has a total gain on sale of her partnership interest of $400.11 8
From an economic perspective, W has experienced an ordinary gain of $400
(the $500 increase in the value of the inventory prior to contribution, minus
the $100 decrease in the value of the inventory attributable to W after
contribution). If the partnership applies the traditional method for making
section 704(c) allocations, however, only $300 of ordinary gain can be
allocated to W.1 19 The remaining $100 of W's gain would be capital, 120
118 W has an amount realized of $900 and a basis of $500 under section 722.
119 This is because the inventory would be sold for $800 in the hypothetical sale.
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thereby resulting in a conversion of $100 of ordinary income into capital
gain.
Even more problematic, though, is the distortion to N that might occur
when the partnership sells the inventory. Imagine that after N purchases W' s
partnership interest, the partnership sells the inventory for $900. In this
case, there is a book loss of $100 on the sale. This book loss should be
allocated equally between N and X, according to their interests in the
partnership. Critically, because there was no actual sale of the inventory at
the time of hypothetical sale (at the sale of W's partnership interest), the
inventory retains a basis of $500 to the partnership. 12 1  The sale of the
inventory results in a tax gain of $400. Such gain cannot be allocated to X,
who experienced a loss with respect to the inventory. Instead, it must be
allocated to N, who stands in for W with respect to the inventory, which was
contributed by W. 1
22
Even if a special basis adjustment were made for N on purchase of W's
partnership interest, the special basis adjustment would reflect only the gain
actually allocated on the hypothetical sale. 123 Specifically, the special basis
adjustment would be $300.124 As a result, N would be allocated $400 of tax
120 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2) (2013).
121 I.R.C. § 723.
122 See Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(j)(3)(ii) (2004) (providing examples of application of
section 704(c) after sale of partnership interest).
123 Here, too, there is some potential ambiguity in the regulatory language. The
regulations provide that a transferee partner gets a special basis adjustment equal to the
excess of the transferee partner's outside basis over the transferee's share of the adjusted
basis to the partnership of the partnership's property. Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b). The
transferee's share of the adjusted basis of partnership property is equal to the transferee's
share of previously taxed capital plus share of partnership liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1.743-
l(d)(1). In this case, the transferee's share of previously taxed capital would equal the
amount of cash the transferee would receive on liquidation immediately following the
hypothetical sale of all partnership assets decreased by "[t]he amount of gain (including any
remedial allocations under § 1. 704-3(d)), that would be allocated to the transferee from the
hypothetical transaction (to the extent attributable to the acquired partnership interest)."
Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(d)(1)(iii) (2004) (emphasis added). However, as with Treas. Reg.
§ 1.751-1(a)(2) (2004), the regulations here seem designed to accommodate optional
remedial allocations, but not require remedial allocations.
124 The special basis adjustment would be calculated as follows:
New partner N's outside basis in the partnership of $900 - N's share of previously taxed
capital of $600. The $600 is determined by the $900 of cash that N would receive on
liquidation following the hypothetical transaction less the $300 gain allocated from the
hypothetical transaction, if the traditional method for making section 704(c) allocations is
applied. Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b) (2004). The $300 gain allocated from the hypothetical
transaction would reflect the application of the ceiling rule.
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gain on sale of the inventory, which would be reduced by N's $300 special
basis adjustment. The net tax gain for N would be $100.125
To some extent, it is appropriate for N to experience a tax gain on sale
of the inventory. The inventory has increased in value by $100 since the
purchase of N's interest in the partnership. Nonetheless, only $50 of that
increase in value will be allocated (in the form of a reduced book loss) to N.
As a result, N will have $50 tax gain in excess of economic, or book gain.
If a remedial allocation were made at the time of sale of the inventory, this
problem would become even worse for N. The remedial allocation would
provide X with a $50 tax loss to match her $50 book loss on the sale of the
inventory. 126 Under the remedial method, this would presumably have to
be matched with $50 of tax gain for N.127 The result would be an inclusion
of $150 of tax gain for N, whereas N experienced only a $50 gain with
respect to the inventory from an economic perspective. An additional $100
of built-in gain from the inventory ended up being recognized on the actual
sale of the inventory, relative to the amount taken into account by Won the
hypothetical sale of the inventory at the time of W's sale of partnership
interest.
Since the ceiling rule previously limited the amount of built-in gain W
actually had to take into account, N is left responsible for the additional
built-in gain. New partner N, of course, did not contribute the inventory,
but nonetheless is left holding the bag. The bottom line is that when the
sale of the partnership interest itself yields ceiling rule distortions, not only
are character conversions possible for the contributing and noncontributing
partners, but also additional distortions (by way of overtaxation or
undertaxation) may apply to the purchasing partner when the ceiling rule
limited property is ultimately sold. Far from being perfectly unwound on
sale of the partnership interest, the ceiling rule misallocations may only
begin to do mischief on sale of a partnership interest.
In sum, the combination of the ceiling rule and the basic rules
governing liquidations and sales of partnership interests creates the
potential for extensive delays and character conversions. In many
situations, unwinding will not occur on liquidation. With both liquidations
and sales of partnership interests, permanent character conversions will
occur in a wide array of possibilities. Sales of partnership interests may
actually create ceiling rule misallocations, the effects of which may be long
25 I.R.C. § 743(b).
126 See Treas. Reg. § 1.743-10)(3)(ii), ex. 3 (2004) (describing application of remedial
allocation method for sale of property subsequent to sale of partnership interest).
127 See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(1) (2013) (mandating remedial item for contributor
to offset remedial allocation to noncontributor).
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lasting and may even be borne in part by a new, purchasing partner. It is
difficult to justify situations in which perfect unwinding does not occur,
when starting from the premise that any misallocations flowing from the
ceiling rule are errors that should ultimately be corrected. Rather, whether
and to what extent imperfect unwinding occurs depends on a variety of
arbitrary facts regarding the assets the partnership holds at the time of
liquidation or sale of a partnership interest and the interaction of such facts
with inordinately complicated partnership tax rules. At bottom, a broad-
based evaluation reveals that the combination of the ceiling rule and the
rules governing liquidations and sales of partnership interests creates a
somewhat haphazard, and difficult to justify, system of taxation.
V. A BROAD-BASED EVALUATION OF THE CEILING RULE
The unwinding issues examined here advance the broader case for
elimination of the ceiling rule. The perpetuation of the ceiling rule creates
an enormously complex tax regime, with unjustifiable planning
opportunities that accrue to the well informed. The Treasury Department
could potentially, and Congress could certainly, eliminate the ceiling rule.
Nevertheless, Congress seems not to have done so in part based on
mistaken assumptions that the impact of the ceiling rule is limited, as a
result of unwinding on liquidation or sale or a partnership interest. Having
thoroughly undermined these assumptions, this article displays that there is
no reasonable justification for retaining the ceiling rule.
As an initial matter, the existence of the ceiling rule creates an
extremely complex regime, so complex that it is even difficult to describe
the rules. The section 704(c) regulations set forth three separate methods of
making section 704(c) allocations: the traditional method, the traditional
method with curative allocations, and the remedial method. The choice of
methods only becomes important to the extent that a ceiling rule limitation
would otherwise occur, because only in such situations will the three
different methods produce different results. 128 The section 704(c) regime
may therefore best be described as the choice between three different ways
to address the ceiling rule problem.
In order to understand the section 704(c) regime and the impact that the
choice of a particular method might have, taxpayers must understand and be
128 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1), -3(d)(1) (2013) (explaining that "to correct
distortions created by the ceiling rule, a partnership using the traditional method under
paragraph (b) of this section may make reasonable curative allocations to reduce or eliminate
disparities between book and tax items of noncontributing partners," and that "a partnership
may adopt the remedial allocation method described in this paragraph to eliminate
distortions caused by the ceiling rule.").
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able to predict when a ceiling rule limitation might occur. Taxpayers
contributing depreciable property with tax basis less than the book value
attributable to the noncontributing partners should realize that a ceiling rule
limitation will likely occur. 129  On the other hand, whether or not
nondepreciable, contributed property will create a ceiling rule limitation
will depend on the ultimate sale price of the property, a fact often
unknowable at the time of the contribution. 130 The existence of the ceiling
rule therefore in many cases makes section 704(c) a choice between
methods if a given set of contingent facts occurs.
To make matters significantly more complicated, Congress at least
partially repealed the ceiling rule in 2004 in the case of losses. Congress did
so in 2004 by putting in place section 704(c)(1)(C), which provides:
(C) if any property so contributed has a built-in loss-
(i) such built-in loss shall be taken into account only in
determining the amount of items allocated to the contributing
partner, and
(ii) except as provided in regulations, in determining the amount of
items allocated to other partners, the basis of the contributed
property in the hands of the partnership shall be treated as being
equal to its fair market value at the time of contribution.
129 To understand this assertion, imagine that A contributes depreciable property with a
fair market value (and therefore book value) at the time of contribution of $300. The
partnership is an equal one-third partnership, in which each of A, B, and C holds a one-third
interest in all partnership income, losses, and capital. Based on these facts, $100 in book
value from the contributed property will be allocated to each of B and C. They will each be
entitled to take depreciation for book purposes of $100 for the contributed property. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3) (2013). As a result, the contributed property must have
at least $200 of tax basis in order for B and C to be able to depreciate for tax purposes an
amount equal to their book depreciation. The analysis is more complex if there is a sale prior
to full book depreciation.
130 See Shortcomings of Existing Regulations, supra note 67, at 650 ("Unlike ceiling
rule limitations of depreciation or depletion, ceiling rule limitations of gain or loss are
attributable to post-contribution changes in value."); Barksdale Hortenstine & Gregory J.
Marich, An Analysis of the Rules Governing Partnership Allocations with Respect to
Contributed Properties: The Final Regulations Under Section 704(c)(1999), reprinted in
THE CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-
OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS, Tax 799, 39-40
(Louis S. Freeman ed., 6 vol., 2011) [hereinafter An Analysis of the Rules] (discussing the
limited potential for abuse of the ceiling rule in the case of sales, as a result of the difficulty
in predicting the application of the ceiling rule).
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By indicating that built-in losses can only be taken into account by
contributing partners, the provision seems to dictate that the ceiling rule
will not apply in the case of a contribution of built-in loss property.
Imagine the following facts: A and B form a partnership. Partner A
contributes Property A in exchange for a one-half interest in all partnership
profits, losses, and capital. Property A has a basis in A's hands of $200 and
a fair market value of $50 - a built-in loss of $150. B contributes cash of
$50 in exchange for a one-half interest in all partnership profits, losses, and
capital. After the contributions, the partnership balance sheet is as follows:
ASSETS CAPITAL ACCOUNTS (AND
OUTSIDE BASIS (OB))
Basis Book Tax Book OB
Cash 50 50 A 200 50 200
Property A 200 50 B 50 50 50
Total 250 100 Total 250 100 250
Imagine that Property A ultimately is sold by the partnership for $90.
In this case, Property A is being sold for a book gain of $40, but a tax loss
of $110. For book purposes, $20 of gain should be allocated to each A and
B, in accordance with their economic agreement. 131 In order for tax to
follow book for the noncontributor (or the "other partner," within the terms
of the statutory provision), $20 of gain would also have to be allocated to B
for tax purposes. If the ceiling rule applied, there would be no tax gain that
could be allocated to B, because there is no tax gain available at the
partnership level. Failure to allocate tax gain to B would allow B to avoid
tax gain with respect to the $20 gain experienced by B for book purposes.
This result would occur because part of A's precontribution built-in loss
would be shifted to B, thereby reducing the tax gain that would otherwise
be allocated to B.
By directly stating that "built-in loss shall be taken into account only in
determining the amount of items allocated to the contributing partner,"
132
section 704(c)(1)(C)(i) appears to prevent this result, and thereby prevent
application of the ceiling rule in the case of built-in loss property. Instead,
the text of section 704(c)(1)(C)(i) appears to require B to be allocated $20
gain for tax purposes, to match the $20 gain allocated to B for book
purposes. The text of section 704(c)(1)(C)(ii) supports this result. If "the
basis of the contributed property in the hands of the partnership [was]
131 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2013).
132 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C)(i).
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treated as being equal to its fair market value at the time of contribution," 133
then the basis of Property A would be treated as $50. The gain on sale of
the property would be $40, $20 of which would be allocated to B, in
accordance with B's one-half interest in the partnership. 134
The above interpretation of section 704(c)(1)(C) leaves open the
question of what should happen to partner A on the sale of Property A.
Section 704(c)(1)(C) does not appear to dictate a remedial allocation of loss
for the contributor. Such a remedial allocation appears only fair, however,
and the correct tax result, for a number of reasons. First, if an essentially
remedial allocation of $20 of gain for tax purposes if being allocated to B, it
seems that an offsetting remedial allocation of $20 of loss for tax purposes
should be allocated to A. Otherwise, the partners, as a whole would be
recognizing too much gain, by virtue of the $20 of tax gain allocated to B,
without any offsetting loss.135 Additionally, A would have experienced a
total of a $130 loss with respect to Property A ($150 loss prior to
contribution of Property A minus one-half of the $40 gain after the
contribution of Property A). Without a remedial allocation of loss to A, A
would be allocated only a $110 loss for tax purposes (the $110 loss
recognized at the partnership level on sale of Property A). The allocation of
$20 of remedial loss to A would be necessary in order for the tax results to
A to match the book results. Notwithstanding this reasoning, in the absence
of regulations, it is not entirely clear what the tax treatment should be with
respect to contributors of built-in loss property.
Moreover, a number of commentators have questioned whether section
704(c)(1)(C) does eliminate the ceiling rule generally in the case of built-in
losses (as suggested above), or whether it merely prevents the duplication
of built-in losses when there is a liquidation or sale of the contributing
partner's partnership interest prior to realization of the built-in loss at the
partnership level. 136 This view is based on the legislative history of section
704(c)(1)(C), which discusses in particular liquidation or sale of the
contributing partner's partnership interest prior to realization of the built-in
loss at the partnership level. 137
113 I.R.C. § 704(c)(l)(C)(ii).
134 Cf CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 94 (taking this approach and
explaining that section 704(c)(1)(C) "would appear to override the regulatory ceiling rule
with respect to built-in losses").
135 See id. at 96 (also discussing the need to offset the essentially remedial allocation to
the noncontributor with an offsetting essentially remedial allocation to the contributor).
136 See, e.g., ALAN GUNN & JAMES R. REPETTI, PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXATION 87-88
(4th ed. 2005); WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 67 at 10-142.
137 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONG., at 384-86 (Comm. Print 2005); H.R. REP.
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A number of treatises suggest that in enacting section 704(c)(1)(C),
Congress only meant to address this narrower set of circumstances. The
Willis and Postlewaite treatise indicates, "The legislative history behind the
enactment [of 704(c)(1)(C)] appears to suggest that the provision is
applicable only to post-sale or post-liquidation transactions." '138 The Gunn
and Repetti treatise similarly relies on legislative history to explain their
view that, "We expect that those regulations will limit the application of
704(c)(1)(C) to cases involving transfers of interests by and distributions to
partners who have contributed loss property." 139 Many other commentators
have weighed in on the question one way or another. 
140
Perhaps the clearest conclusion at present is that the enactment of
section 704(c)(1)(C) has created significant uncertainty about how, if at all,
the ceiling rule operates in the context of contribution of built-in loss
property. Indeed, if the operation of section 704(c)(1)(C) is limited to
circumstances in which there is a liquidation or sale of the contributing
partner's partnership interest prior to realization of the built-in loss at the
partnership level, then whether or not the ceiling rule will operate would
seem to depend on a striking number of contingent possibilities. These
include: (1) whether the traditional method for making section 704(c)
allocations is selected; (2) whether the property is built-in gain or loss
property; (3) whether a ceiling rule limitation would apply based on the sale
price of property or the tax depreciation available for depreciable assets;
and (4) whether, in the case of built-in loss property, there is a liquidation
or sale of the contributor's interest prior to ultimate realization of the built-
in loss at the partnership level. This set of possibilities confirms that the
ceiling rule, which was borne out of an original desire to simplify
partnership tax, 141 is currently doing anything but.
142
No 108-755, at 621 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341, 1684; H.R.
REP. No. 108-548, at 281-83 (2004).
118 WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 67 at 10-142.
139 GUNN & REPETrI, supra note 136, at 87-88.
140 See, e.g., GEORGE MUNDSTOCK, A UNIFIED APPROACH TO SIJBCHAPTERS K S 103 (2d
ed. 2006); YIN & BURKE, supra note 34, at 177; Darryll Jones, It's the Ceiling Rule, Stupid!,
107 TAx NOTES 1579 (2005); Lukasz Rachuba, New Issues With Partnership Built-In Loss
Property, 107 TAX NOTES 1569 (2005).
141 See, e.g., Laura E. Cunningham & Noel B. Cunningham, Simplifying Subchapter K:
The Deferred Sale Method, 51 SMU L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997) (explaining that in setting forth
the original section 704(c) regime, "Congress (and the A.L.I.) seemed primarily concerned
with making the law simple and consistent with the expectations of partners."). As explored
earlier in the article, the ceiling rule can be seen as a vestige of the original section 704(c)
regime that was put in place, in the form of the original section 704(c)(1).
142 Andrea Monroe has forcefully made this point with respect to section 704(c)(1)(C).
In response to the complexity resulting from section 704(c)(1)(C), Monroe has stated,
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Unfortunately, the choice of alternative methods under section 704(c)
actually does not eliminate the complexity introduced by the ceiling rule.
As Steven Dean, Heather Field, and others have explored, when taxpayers
face the possibility of choosing between alternative regimes, planning often
ensues as taxpayers assess the alternatives in order to determine which
possibility results in the lowest tax liability. 143 As a result, the fact that
alternatives to the traditional method with the ceiling rule exist does not
mean that taxpayers are simply going to avoid dealing with the ceiling rule.
Rather, it means that, to the extent possible, taxpayers may assess the tax
results under all of the possible methods, choosing the one that is likely to
result in the lowest tax liability. 144 This dynamic also means that the
benefits of choosing between the three methods will tend to accrue to well-
informed taxpayers in particular, who will be best suited to manipulate the
alternatives to minimize their tax liability. Creating an enormously
complex tax regime that will offer well-informed taxpayers in particular the
possibility of minimizing tax liability through the consideration of various
taxing regimes is difficult to justify. 145
In considering the complexity and planning opportunities created by
the ceiling rule, it is worthwhile to revisit and restate explicitly a point from
the beginning of this article. When the ceiling rule applies, it
uncontrovertibly results in misallocations of income, gain, loss, and
deduction. The undesirable complexity and disparate planning opportunities
introduced by the ceiling rule are therefore being borne to perpetuate
mistaxation. This situation calls for serious reconsideration of the ceiling
rule. To the extent that long-standing assumptions regarding the unwinding
of the ceiling rule have dampened concern about its application, this article
eliminates this source of sanguinity, thereby making a final push toward
elimination of the ceiling rule.
"Despite the commendable policy shift.., its practical effect is disastrous." Monroe, supra
note 34, at 1419.
143 Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, The Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (2005); Heather M.
Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax
System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 27-32 (2010).
144 See Terence Floyd Cuff, The Traditional Method Under Section 704(c)(1)(A), 34 J.
REAL EST. TAX'N 117, 10-145 (2007) ("The only way to determine which method is most
favorable for each partner is to prepare a spreadsheet indicating the effect of each method.");
see also Monroe, supra note 34, at 1420 ("To state the obvious, the simultaneous application
of three independent allocation methodologies, each the subject of highly technical
regulations, is anything but simple.").
145 In a prior work I discuss arguments sometimes made in favor of price discrimination
with respect to taxation. For this discussion, see Leigh Osofsky, Who's Naughty and Who's
Nice? Screening, Frictions, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1068 n.32 (2013).
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The Treasury Department, potentially, and Congress, certainly, could
eliminate the ceiling rule and thereby eliminate the mistaxation as well as
the accompanying complexity and planning opportunities. Some
commentators, however, have suggested that the Treasury Department
might not have the authority to overrule the ceiling rule. 14 6  Other
commentators have discussed how the Treasury Department itself at least
seemed to think it might not have the authority to overrule the ceiling rule
in response to Congress's 1984 redrafting of section 704(c). 147 This belief
appears to be based on the legislative history, in which the 1984 house
report and the conference report stated that the regulations for the new law
"generally will provide for the same result that is achieved under present
law."' 148 Since the ceiling rule was part of the old section 704(c)(2) regime,
this statement could be read to reflect Congress's intention for the ceiling
rule to be maintained after 1984.149
Even if the Treasury Department could have issued regulations
eliminating the ceiling rule after Congress's 1984 redrafting, its reissuance
of new regulations would require new notice and comment rulemaking
under the APA. 150 In any event, whether or not the Treasury Department
could eliminate the ceiling rule today, Congress certainly can, as illustrated
by Congress's at least partial repeal of the ceiling rule in the case of losses,
in the form of section 704(c)(1)(C). For the reasons suggested in this
article, Congress, if not the Treasury Department, should take this step and
finally unwind the ceiling rule itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis in this article sets forth a perhaps surprisingly interesting
case study in how the intellectual apprehension of complex material can
146 See, e.g., Hortenstine & Marich, supra note 130, at 24:
One must not overlook the fact that repeal of the Ceiling Rule (or even relaxation
of such rule through an anti-abuse rule) is not simply the elimination of a
regulatory rule of convenience - it is a substantial erosion of Sections 703, 721,
722, and 723. To the extent the dictates of the Ceiling Rule are eliminated or
even relaxed, Section 704(c) becomes far more than a mere allocation provision.
Only Congress has the discretion to impose such a change to the existing
statutory framework ....
147 See Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), supra note 34, at 116-17.
148 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1209 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 875-76;
see also H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 855 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1543.
149 But see supra note 58 for an alternative possible reading.
10 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) ('rule making' means agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule").
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occur in phases. The problems flowing from misallocations with respect to
contributed property have existed since the beginning of partnership
taxation, but Congress and partnership tax experts have only realized these
problems over time. The history of such realizations and lack of
realizations exemplifies how sometimes only by really focusing on a long-
accepted assumption can we appreciate the extent to which the assumption
masks a much more complicated and problematic reality.
This article has focused in particular on the problems hiding just
beneath the surface of common assumptions regarding ceiling rule
misallocations. Doing so undermines the long-held belief that the ceiling
rule misallocations have only limited impact. As revealed in this article, the
complex and unintended interactions between the ceiling rule
misallocations and the rules governing liquidations and sales of partnership
interests yield a variety of haphazard, difficult to justify results, which may
last long after liquidation or sale of a partnership interest. The assumption
regarding the limited impact of the ceiling rule therefore does not provide a
reasonable justification for maintaining what is in fact a wholly
unjustifiable provision.
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